Substitution boxes (S-boxes) are a crucial component of DES-like block ciphers. This research addresses problems with previous approaches towards constructing S-boxes, and proposes a new definition for the robustness of S-boxes to differentia/ cryptana/ysis, which is the most powerful cryptan&-]ytic attack-known to date. A novel method based on group Hadam&rd matrices is developed to systematically generate S-boxes that satisfy a number of critics/cryptographic properties. Among the properties are the high nonlinearity, the strict avalanche chaxacteristics, the ba/ancedness, the robnstne~ against differentia/cryptana/ysis, and the immunity to linear cryptana/ysis. An example is provided to illustrate the S-box generating method.
INTRODUCTION

Differential cryptanalysi$ discovered by Btham and
Shamlr [3, 4] is currently the most powerful cryptanalytic attack to (secret-key) block ciphers, especially to DES-like substitution-permutation ciphers. The attack applies also to other cryptographic primitives such as one-way hash functions.
Since differential cryptana/ysis was introduced, researchers have devoted a large number of efforts to designing substitution boxes (S-boxes) in order to strengthen the security of a block cipher against the attack [13, 1, 14, 16, 15, 2] . Although these S-boxes are interesting in terms of their security against differentia/cryptana/ysis, they bear a number of shortcomings which render them unattractive in practice. These shortcomings will be fully addressed in Section 3. Here we mention briefly two of them: (1) The S-boxes are based on permutation polynomials on finite fields, and hence have an equal number of input and output bits. Note that existing ciphers including DES, LOKI and FEAL employ S-boxes with less output bits than input bits. Though dropping an appropriate number of component functions from a permutation polynomial yields an S-box with less output bits, there "The first author was supported in part by the Atmtrafisn Research Council under the reference numbers A49130102, A9030136, A49131885 and A4923217"2, the second author by A49130102, and the third author by A492321T2. Permission to copy without fee all or part of this materiel is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the ACM copyright notice and the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association for Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission. is no guarantee that the resulting S-box is robust against differentia] cryptana/ysis. (2) None of the component functions of the S-boxes satisfies the strict ava/an-che criterion (SAC). The SAC is considered as an indispensable requirement for S-boxes employed by a modern block cipher.
This research initiates the investigation of methods for systematically constructing S-boxes with a number of essentia/cwptographic properties. These properties include: security against differentia/cryptana/ysis, immunity to the very recently discovered linear crypta~a/ysis [12] , the SAC, ba/ancedness, high noulineaxity, and uncorrelatedness. (Two or more Boolean functions are said to be uncorrelated if their sum gives a nonfinearly balanced function). A novel S-box construction method bos~i on group Hadamard matrices is presented. An n-input s-output S-box (namely, am n × $ Sbox) constructed using this method, where s > Ln/2J, has the features now described.
1. It is at least (1-2-')-robust agaLnst differentia/cryptanalysis, where t is a parameter subject to the condition that (s-[n/2J) > t _-> 3. For instance, when t ---3, 5, or 7, the robustness is 0.875, 0.97 or 0.99 respectively. (See Section 3 for the definition of robustness.) 2. The sum of any subset of the component functions is a noniine&rly balanced function. Hence the component functions &re all uncorrelated. 3. The nonlinearity of ~ny component function is at least 2 n-l -2 *-'-I , which is a very high va/ue, and its maximum algebraic degree is n -s + t + I. 4. All component functions satisfy the SAC. 5. For each s-bit vector y, there are exactly 2 n-" n-bit vectors that &re mapped to y. That is, the S-box is a regular many-to-one mapping. These statements are very informs/. The interested reader is directed to Section 6 for precise descriptions.
Section 2 introduces basic notations and definitions, and Section 3 addresses problems with prev/ous]y proposed methods for constructing S-boxes. A new definition for robnstness against differentia/ cryptana]ysis is introduced in the same section. Our first attempt to construct S-boxes is described in Section 4, while improvements towards the robustness of the S-boxes are described in Section 5. This is followed by a discussion of further refinement in Section 6. An analysis of the number of different S-boxes that cam be obtained by our method is conducted in Section 7. Section 8 shows that the S-boxes constructed are also immune to llnear cryptama/ysis. An interesting relation between the SAC and the profile of the difference distribution table of a.u S-box is revealed in the same section. To illustrate the construction method, an example is shown in Section 9. The extended abstract is dosed by some finn/remarks in Section I0.
BASIC DEFINITIONS
The vector space of n tuples of elements from GF(2) is denoted by V~. Vectors in V, and integers in [0, 2" -1] have a natural one-to-one correspondence. This allows us to switch from a vector in V~ to its corresponding integer in [0, 2" -1], and vice versa. Let f be a (Boolean) function from I/. to GF(2) (or simply, a function on V,). The sequence of f is defined as ((-1) 1(~°), (-1)Y(°:), ..., (-1)1(°~'-~)), while the truth table of f is defined as (f(c~0), f(cq) .... , f(c~-_,)), where ai, i = 0, 1,... ,2" -1, denote the vectors in V~. f is said to be balanced if its truth table has an equal number of zeros and ones.
We call h(z) = a~z~ ~... ~a,z, (~ c an afline function, where z = (z~ ..... z,) and aj, c ~ GF (2) . In particular, h will be called a linear function if c ----0. The sequence of an sfllne (linear) function will be called an afllne (linear) sequence.
The Hamming weight of a vector z, denoted by W(z), is the number of ones in z. Let f and g be functions on 1/,. Then d(f, g) = ~'~/(*)¢~(~) 1, where the addition is over the reals, is called the Hamming distance between f and g. Let ~00,..., ~%~+~_~ be the afline functions on V,. Then N! = min;ffi 0 ...,~,+~_~ d(f,~0~) is called the nonlinearity of f. It is well-]~,~own that the noulineaxity of f on Vn s~tisfies N! -~ 2 "-~ -2~ "-~. An extensive investigation of highly nonlinear balanced functions has been carded out in [22] .
Let a = (a~ ..... a,) ~ V, and 3 -(b~ ..... b,) E V,. Then the scalar product of a and ~8, denoted by (a,/8), is defined by (a, ~8) = (~)~=~ a:bj, where the addition and the multiplication are over GF (2) . A function f on V, is said to be bent if for every 3 ~ V., where z -(z~ .... ,z,) [18] . Here f(z)(~ (8, z) is considered as a rex] valued function. Bent functions exist only when n is even, and they achieve the maximum nonlinearity of 2 "-~ -2½ "-~ [18, 10] .
The concept of SAC was originally introduced in [26] . where y = (yl,...,y,) and ; = 1 (~ i. For instance, when s = 2 we have D0,0(yl,y2) = (1 ~ yl)(1 ~ y2), and when s = 3 we have D1,0.1(yl,Y~,y3) = y1(1 ~y2)y3. Clearly De(y) = 1 if and only if y = ~. To further simplify our description, D6 will also be denoted by D, where i is the integer in [0, 2' -1] whose binary representation is 6. 172
Let fo, .f~ ..... f2,-I be functions on V¢. Then the concatenation of these functions is
1(y, x)=
where is = (y1,...,y,) and x = (z] ..... z,). Note that f is a function on V,+t. The following lemma is derived from Theorems 4 and 5 of [23] . A good S-box must be a regular mapping. Otherwise some output vectors appear more often than others when the input to the S-box is chosen uniformly at random, and a cryptosystem that employs the S-box might be vulnerable to a cryptanalyst who exploits the bias.
DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
The essence of differential cryptanalysis is that it exploits particular entries in the difference distribution tables of Sboxes employed by a block cipher. Entries with higher values axe particularly useful to the attack. The difference distribution table of an n × s S-box is a 2" × 2" matrix. The rows of the matrix, indexed by the vectors in Vn, represent the change in the input, while the columns, indexed by the vectors in V,, represent the change in the output of the S-box. An entry in the table indexed by (AX, Ay) indicates the number of input vectors which, when changed by AX (in the sense of bit-wise XOR), result in a change in the output by Ay (also in the sense of bit-wise XOR). Note that an entry in the table can only take an even value, the sum of the values in a row is always 2", and the first row is always (2",0,...,0). Also note that the first column indicates the smoothness of the S-box, namely the characteristic that a change in the input does not result in a change in the output. As is discussed below, the smoothness is an extremely useful characteristic to differential cryptana]ysis. To thwart differential cryptanalysis, the difference distribution tables of the S-boxes employed by a DES-like block cipher must not contain entries with large values (not counting the first entry in the first row). Based on this observation, the initial reaction was to construct S-boxes with fiat (i.e. uniform) difference distribution tables [13, 1] . However, as was pointed out in [4, 5] , having no large values is not sufficient to prevent differential cryptanalysis, and in fact, a block cipher that employs S-boxes with fiat difference distribution tables is easily breakable by differential cryptanalysis that exploits the iterative characteristics of the cipher (see Definition 12 of [3] 
The robustness of an n x s S-box is small if R or L is large. For instance, the robustness of an n × s S-box is merely 1 L * ~r(1 --~r) < ~ if its difference distribution table contains only nonzero entries in its first column. Such an S-box is extremely prone to differential cryptanalysis. Examples of such weak S-boxes include those with fiat difference distribution tables proposed in [13, 1] .
Large robustness is obtained only when both R and L are small. For the S-boxes to be constructed in the coming sections we have R m ~ and L ----2"-', where t is parameter satisfying (s -[n/2]) > t _> 3. An S-box attains the maximum robustness when R and L achieve their smallest possible vaJues simultaneously. Clearly, the smallest possible value for L is 2"-'. As an S-box which achieves this value has a fiat difference distribution table, we have R = 2" -1 and hence the robustness is less than !;. Therefore to make R sm~ll, L must be at least 2 "-°÷I. In the following discussions we suppose that L = > 2 "-'+I. Two cases, n > s and n = s, are considered in order to determine the set of possible small values for R. When n > s, an S-box defines a many-to-one mapping. For such an S-box, we have R _-> 1. Thus the robustness against differential cryptanalysis is bounded from above by (1 -2J¢)(1 -2-'+1). To decide S-boxes which achieve the upper bound for robustness, consider an n × s S-box whose difference distribution table has the following profile: each row, except the first, of the table contains an equal number of zero and nonzero entries, and the nonzero entries all contain a value 2 "-°+* . Thus we have L = 2 "-'+2. The upper bound would be achieved if R = 1. However, it has been proved in [24] that if each row, except the first, of the table contains an equal number of zero and nonzero entries, then R must be 2 "-1 -2 '-1. Consequently the robustness of the S-box is less than 3 This example indicates that finding a ~-. good combination of R and L is not easy. It is not clear to the authors whether or not the upper bound (1 -2-]~)(1 -2 -*÷~) is actually attainable. Nevertheless, it will be seen in Sections 5 and 6 that there exist S-boxes whose robustness is very close the upper bound.
Next we consider the case when n = s, namely when an S-box is a permutation V,. As any change in the input to a 173 permutation results in a change in the output, the first column of its difference distribution table contains only zeros except for the first entry. Therefore the mzvdmum robustness against differential crypt,malysis is (1 -2 -"+1). The maximum robustness is attained by a permutation with the following difference distribution table: except for the first row, half of the entries in a row contain the value 2 while the other half contain the value 0. Such S-boxes have been extensively investigated in [14, 16, 15, 2] . These S-boxes, however, suffer some or all of the drawbacks described below, which render them unattractive in practice.
1. Their component functions are quadratic. This is true for all the permutations in [17, 16] , the first type of permutations in [15] , and some of the permutations in [2] . A block cipher that employs functions with such a low algebraic degree as S-boxes would be vulnerable to more classic cryptanalytic attacks than the state-ofthe-art differential cryptanalysis.
2. It has been suggested that an n × s S-box, where s < n, be constructed by omitting component functions from a permutation on $I. [14, 16, 15, 2] . However, in general, omitting component functions of a (1 -2-"+*) -robust permutation does not yield a robust n × a S-box.
In particular, we have proved in [24] that for any n × n S-box whose component functions axe quadratic, dropping a component function results in an n × (n -1) S-box whose robustness against differential cryptanalysis is only ~(1 -2 -'+2) < ½. The robustness decays drastically as more component functions are dropped. We conjecture that a similar phenomenon happens even in the more general case where component functions of an n × n S-box are not quadratic.
3. An S-box is said to satisfy the SAC if its component functions all satisfy the SAC. This property is considered to be at least as essential as the robustness against differentia/crypta~alysis. This issue has been completely neglected in [17, 14, 16, 15, 2] , and none of the S-boxes constructed in those papers satisfies the SAC.
4. The S-boxes, with the following two exceptions, only accept an odd number of input bits. Applications of such S-boxes are limited. The first exception is some of the S-boxes constructed in [2] which accept an even number of input bits. Unfortunately the component functions of these S-boxes are all quadratic. The second exception is the inverse function on GF(2") defined by
Results proved in [15] indicate that the robustness of F(X) against differentia/cryptanalysis is (1-2 -"+* ) when n is odd, and (1 -2 -"+2) when n is even. As the input to the function has to be checked against the value zero, it would be very inconvenient to use the function in practical applications. Although this inconvenience can be removed by using look up tables, the amount of memory required in storing the tables becomes intolerable when n is large.
Interesting results on constructing S-boxes have been presented in [9] . These include a few 5 × 5 S-boxes which are (1 -2-4)-robust against differential cryptanalysis. Although these S-boxes satisfy the SAC, they all bear the other three shortcomings. In addition, since the method relies on exhaustive search, it is beyond the currently available computing power to find a larger, say 7 x 7, S-box with similar properties.
A final remark is that the construction methods used in [17, 14, 16, 9, 15, 2] are essentially the same from a technical point of view: they are all based on permutation polynomials on GF(2"). Although such permutations &re easy to analyze, they have a very restricted form end consist of only a small portion among all the permutations on GF(2").
In the following sections we take a completely different approach, which is based on group Hadamard matrices, towards constructing S-boxes. The S-boxes generated using the new approach will free of all the drawbacks addressed above. Before going into the description of the new approach, we note that DES employs eight 6 × 4 S-boxes. The difference distribution tables of the S-boxes can be found in [3] . Table 1 shows that the robustness of the eight Sboxes against differential cryptxnalysis is between 0.316 -0.469. The values are far less than (1 -~)(1-2 -s) = 0.861, the upper bound for the robustness of a 6 × 4 S-box. This might paxtial]y explain why differential cryptxnalysis of DES Was SO successful.
CONSTRUCTING S-BOXES (PART i) --THE FIRST ATTEMPT
We present our method for constructing robust S-boxes in three steps. The first step which is described in this section shows how to construct S-boxes whose component functions axe highly nonlinear end also satisfy the SAC. A shortcoming of these S-boxes is that they axe not robust against differential cryptmaalysis. This shortcoming is removed in the second step which is described in the next section. This is followed by another section describing the third step which discusses further refinement on the results.
BENT FUNCTIONS WHICH FORM A GROUP
In [19] , bent functions which form an additive group were constructed. These functions are the starting point of our method for generating S-boxes, end hence are reviewed in the following. A (1,-1)-matzix of order n will be called a Hadamaxd 174 matrix if HH r = hi,, where H r is the transpose of H [25] . A Sylvester-Hadamard matrix ( or Walsh-Hadamard matrix) is a matrix of order 2" generated in the following way:
H.= H._! _//._a ,n=l, 2 .....
Ho=l.
Let G be a group under operation -(dot), end let p = (pl ..... p,), q = (ql,...,q,) be two vectors of length n, whose entries pj, qj come from G. Define the operation E) such that p ® q = (pl • fl,..-,p, • q,), and the inverse of q such that q-1 _ (q~-I ...,q,l). We say that p end q axe sorthogonal if p Q q-i = (pl • q~a ...,p,. q~l ) contains every element in G precisely s times.
A generalized Hadamard matriz [6, 7] of type s for the group G is a square matrix with entries from G whose rows mud columns are both s-orthogonal. A group Hadamard ma. tr/z [8] is a generalized Hadamard matrix whose rows end columns both form a group under the operation ®. Note that in a group Hadxmard matrix of type s for G, there exist n row acting the role of identity, and each of the other rows contains each element of G precisely s times. A similax observation applies to the columns of the matrix. Now let • be a primitive element of GF(2~), and let C be a (2 k -1) × (2 t -1) matrix whose (i, j)th entry, 0 ~ i,j <_ 2 s -2, is defined as cij = • j÷i (rood 2 h-l). Denote by D the
Note that each entry of D is a polynomial in t, whose algebraic degree is at most k-1. Therefore each entry cen be expressed as a0 ~ aae ~.--(~ ak-le k-l, where ai E GF(2). Replacing ei by zi+x, where 0 -< i -< k -1, we obtain a multi-v&riable polynomial a0zl (~aaz2 ~.-. ~ah-azk, which can be viewed as a linear function .on V~. Denote by E be the matrix obtained from D by applying the replacement to all its entries. In [19] , the following interesting result was proved Concatenating the linear functions in the ith row of E results in a function fi on V2k:
where y = (yl,..., yk) end z = (zl,..., Zk). From [19] , we know that fl, Y2 .... , f2*-] are all distinct bent functions on V2k, And that f0, fl ..... f2~-1 form a additive group, with f0 = 0 as its identify element. In the same paper it was also shown that 
. zh) and cj E GF(2).
Conversely, any fi, 
then A = (a~), whose entr~es come ~om GF (2) , is a nondegenerate matr~ of order k.
S-BOXES SATISFYING THE SAC
We have shown that concatenating the functions in a row of E, except the first row, resn]ts in a bent function. Note that a bent function is not baianced. In the following we consider the concatenation of an incomplete or partial row in E.
Let n be an integer with k < n < 2k. We select 2 '~-h distinct columns from the 2 k-1 nonzero columns of E. Denote by H ---(h,j) the 2 k x 2 n-k matrix consisting of the 2 n-~ selected columns, where 0 _< i _< 2 ~ -1 and 0 ___< j -< 2 "-t -1.
Let g, be the function obtained by concatenating the ith row of H = (h,j), namely 
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Now Lemma 2) , and that each linear function in ~ appears precisely once in each nonzero column. These properties :~2"-k-1 h0i(z) = 0, of E, together with the fact that ~ffi0 implies that when the condition (3) is satisfied, we have (~);:o '-1-ho(z ) # 0 for all 2 = < i = < 2 k-1. In other words, g2, ..., g2k--I all achieve the maximum algebraic degree n -k + 1.
To ensure that the condition (3) is satisfied, first we select 2 n-t -] columns from the nonzero columns of E. Next we select a column from the nonzero columns of E that have not been touched so far, and check ¢~i=0 nli(z]. The selection and checking step continues until the condition (3) is satisfied. Since each linear function on Vh appears precisely once in a nonzero row of E, after the first 2 "-k -1 columns are selected, there is at most one column in the untouched l :~2"-k-z hzi(z) = 0. Therefore the columns of E such that '~'i=0 maximum aigebraic degree is always achievable. This proves (iv). A problem with G --(gz .... , gt) is that it does not satisfy the SAC. Using the following Lemma 4 which was first proved in [21] , the problem can be circumvented by a suitable nondegenerate linear transformation on the coordinates of the mapping. Note that the balancedness, the nonlinearity and the algebraic degree of a function are not affected by a nondegenerate linear transformation on coordinates [22] . ]k (4) where I denotes the identity matrix, 0 the zero matrix, and J the matrix whose entries are all ones. Another example that introduces more inter-coordinate dependencies is as follows:
B~x(,~_k) l~
where B is a matrix not containing zero rows and C is an arbitrary matrix, both on GF(2). Denote by II the mapping after applying the linear transformation A to the coordinates of G = (gz,..., g,), namely, n(=) = (,~(=),...,,,(=)) = (gl (xA) .... ,gk(zA)). Although H = (~r~,...,w~) satisfies some of the main requirements for an S-box with regard to nonlinearity, SAC and balancedness, the majority of the rows in its difference distribution table contain no zeros. By • similar argument to that for Lemm• 7 in Subsection 5.3, it can be shown that the difference distribution table has the following profile:
1. in 2 k -1 cases, 2 n-k out of the 2 k entries in a row contain a value 2 ~, while the other 2' -2 n-k entries contain a value zero;
2. in the other 2 n -2' cases (not counting the first row), all the entries in a row contain a value 2 "-~.
Hence the robustness of H against differential cryptanalysis 2 k isonly ~".r(l-~.--;~_-_ )< '
This shortcoming will be removed in the following section. Before going into the detailed description of how it is removed, we note that Lemma 3, together with the discussions •bout the SAC fulfilling properties and the difference distribution tables of G = (gx ..... g~) and H = (~r~,..., ~r,), also holds in the case when g, is defined in the following more general form:
where r. is an arbitrary function on V._~.
$ CONSTRUCTING S-BOXES (PART 11) IMPROVEMENT
This section discusses how to strengthen S-boxes constructed in (6) so that they are much more robust against differential cryptanalysis. We start with a permutation on ]/3 which has many desirable properties. Next we combine an s × k S-box G = (g],...,g~) with the permutation on V~ to obtain an n × (k + 3) S-box, where g, is constructed by (2). Then we show that the new S-box is very robust against differential cryptanalysis.
A PERMUTATION ON V~
Recall that each primitive polynomial defines an msequence (see [11] ). Consider 
Ms = (~,, m~, ms).
It is not hard to verify that M~ is a permutation on Vs. In addition, by using properties of m-sequences or by straightforward verification, one can see that M~ has the two properties described below.
Let re(w) = clml(w) ~ c2m2(w) (~ csms(w) be
a nonzero linear combination of rnl,m2,ms, where cl, c~, cs E GF (2) . Then m is a uonlineaxly balanced function. The nonlinearity of m is 2. Note that 2 is the maximum nonlinearity of a function on Vs.
Let a be • nonzero vector in Vs. When tv runs through
Vs, Ms(w) ~ Ms(w ~ or) runs through 4 vectors in V3
twice each, and never through the other 4 vectors.
ROBUST S-BOXES
Now we combine the permutation on V3 with functions constructed by (2) to obtain an S-box much more robust against differential cryptanalysis. Let n and s be integers with n => 8 > ([n/2J +3), and let k ----s-3. Also let rl --r2 = .
--= rk = 0, rk+l --ml, 
where gi is defined by (2) and i = 1,..., k + 3.
The following ]emma will be used in discussing properties of the functions constructed by (9) . 
. , ~,). Then (i) if g is balanced then f is balanced, (ii) N! >-2'N o, where N! and N o denote the nonlineari.
ties of f and g respectively.
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Proof. Proof. Note that f can be written as ~ [c,,,(,,,) ].
3=2 ÷mk÷2
It is easy to see that f(z) ~ O, and there are only two cases to be considered From Lemma 3 and the discussion on the construction (7) at the end of Subsection 4.2, it follows that f is balanced in Case l. And due to the first property of the permutation on I/3 (see section 5.1) and (i) of Lemma 5, f is balanced in Case 2. This proves (i).
The first half of (ii), which corresponds to Case 1, fob lows from Lemma 3, as well as the discussion on the construction (7). In Case 2, the algebraic degree of f is clearly 2. By (ii) of Lemma 3, the nonlinearity of f is at least In the following we prove that the robustness of • = (¢, .... ,¢t+~) against differential cryptanalysis is (~ + 9--n÷t-3 --2--2n÷2#). When n = k 4.3, • is a permutation on Vn, and its robustness against differential cryptanalysis
PROFILE OF THE DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION TABLE
Now we discuss the difference distribution table of • = (¢1 ..... ¢k+3) constructed by (10) . The following results will simplify our discussions. Let gj be a function on V,, j --1,...,s, and let G - (g~,...,g,) . Also let A be a nondegenerate matrix of order s over GF (2) . Consider F(z) -(g2(z) .... ,g,(z) )A. Note that A is applied to the output of G. 
t vectors, (iii) for the remaining2 n-2 n-~ cases of% ~(z)(9~(z(g7) runs through 2 t+~ vectors in V~÷3 2 n-t-~ times each, but not through the other 2 ~+2 vectors, (iv) the first column contains a value 2 n-t in (2 n-t-~ -1)2 t entries, and a value zero in the other entries (not counting the first entry).
Proof. Let F --(fl ..... f~÷3), where f~ is constructed by (9) . Then ~(z) --F(zA), and hence q~(z) (9 ~(z (9 7) --F(zA) (9 F(zA (9 "rA) . Thus the problem of discussing the difference distribution table of • is reduced to that of F.
Let z = (y, x), y = (y2 .... , y,_~), z = (z2,..., =~) and 
= (g2(z)(gga(z(9~),...,gk(z)(ggk(z(9"r),
g~+x(z) (g g~+2(z (9 7) (9 ml(w) (9 mx(w @ t~), g~+=(=) (9 g~+=(= (9 7) • m=(~,) (9 ,~(~ (9 ~), gk+3(=) (9 gk+3(z (9 7) (9 m3(tv) (9 m3(w ~ ~) ).
As g~+:, gt+2 and gt÷3 axe nonzero linear combinations of
g~ ..... g~, F(z)(~F(z~7) can be written as F(z)~F(z~7) = (Q(z)~Q(z~7))B for some nondegenerate matrix B, where
Q(,) = (~, (,) ..... ~, (,), ,,,, (w), ,,*5 (w), ,,,~ (w)).
Thus the problem is further simplified, and we only have to discuss how Q(z) ~ Q(z ~ 7) runs through the vectors in
Vk÷3.
Fzom (9) ,s(~) ..... h,.s(~)) # (hl,s,(a),..., h,,s,(~)) or equivalently (Q(,) • Q(, • ~))1,.6  = (h,,~,(,) ~ d,,...,h,,,,(,) Finally we consider the first column of the difference distribution table. Recall that the first column differs from the rest of the table in the sense that it indicates the smoothness of the S-box and that it is of paxticulax importance to differential cryptanalysis. When s = k + 3 = n, the S-box is a permutation on V,~, and the first column in its difference distribution table is (2n,0,... ,0) 2`. To exmmine the case when n > s, we consider the solutions of the equation 
n-k-3 --1)2*. This completes the proof. U
The difference distribution table of the S-box has the following profile:
1. the largest number in the 2* -I rows corresponding to Case 1 is 2*, while it is 2 ~-* for the 2 n -2* rows corresponding to Case 2. When n is laxge, the number of rows for Case 2 is significantly laxger than that for Case I;
2. the first column contains a value 2 n-~ in (2 n-a-• -1)2 t entries, and a value zero in the other entries (not counting the first entry);
3. each row contains zero entries.
As a consequence, the robustness e of/: = (~z,...,¢,+~) against differential cryptanalysis is
Thus we have proved:
Another issue with the profde of a di~erence distribution table is the fraction of nonzero entries contained by the table. For an S-box constructed by (10)1 the fraction of nonzero entries in its difference distribution table is between 0.5 -2 -~ ~ 0.44 and 0.5. For the more general construction method described in the next section, the fraction is between 0.5 -2 -0+') and 0.5, where t _>-3. In general, if an S-box is not robust against differential cryptsaalysis, then the smaller the fraction of nonzero entries in the table, the faster the differential cryptanalytic attack [3, 4] . This problem, however, is not significantly relevant to robust S-boxes, including those constructed in this extended abstract.
CONSTRUCTING S-BOXES (PART i!!) REFINEMENT
We have shown that S-boxes constructed by (10) axe at least ~-robnst against differentia] cryptazalysis, and that they axe also very promising in terms of their nonlinearity, algebraic degrees and strict avalemche characteristics. Recall that (10) is obtained from (9) by applying a suitable nondegenerate linear transformation on coordinates, while (9) is the result of combining an S-box defined in (2) with a permutation M~ on V~ whose component functions axe defined by (8) .
We have used the two properties of M~ (see Subsection 5.1) in proving that combining (2) with (8) For odd t __> 3, permutation polynomials based on the %ub-ing" technique [17, 14, 16, 9, 15, 2] satisfy the two requirements. When t = 5, the robustness is laxger than 0.96875, and when t = 7 it is larger than 0.9921875.
? COUNTING ROBUST S-BOXES
Two S-boxes F = (11,-..,1o) sad G = (el .... ,g°) Lre said to be different if the two function sets (]i,..., f,} and {gl ..... p°) differ. We axe interested in the number of different S-boxes that can be generated by our method. Let n, s and t be integers with n -> s > ([n/2J + t) and t > 3, and let k = •-t.
The matrix H consists of 2"-* columns selected from the matrix E (see Subsection 4.2.) The total number of ways in which H is a selected is 2"-* . Each way gives a diferent matrix H. To achieve the maximum algebraic degree n -k + I, we first select 2 "-* --1 columns from E and then select a column from the rest of the columns of E in such a way that the condition (3) is satisfied. This shows that the number of ways of achieving the maximum algebraic degree is
It is easy to verify that permuting the 2 n-~ columns of the matrix H results in a different matrix, and that discussions made above, in particular Lemma 3, and Theorems 6 and 7, also hold in this case. Note that there are 2"-h! different ways to permute the columns of H.
It should be pointed out that S-boxes generated in the above two steps, selecting and permuting, contain all those which can be obtained by selecting a different primitive polynomial of algebraic degree k -1. In other words, selecting a different primitive polynomial does not yield more S-boxes.
On the other hand, Theorems 6 and 7 also hold when g,+l, ..., ga+t, which are used to obtain fk+l, ..., fh+t in the construction (12) , axe replaced by any distinct functions (2'--1) possible chosen from ga, ..., g2'-1-There axe t choices, each of which gives a different S-box. Finally, we can obtain more S-boxes by selecting a different nondegenerate matrix in transforming fl, .-., f,+t into SAC-fulfilling functions. These transformations, however, do not always produce different S-boxes.
In summary, the total number of different S-boxes is at least and when the maximum algebraic degree n-k+l is required, it is at least
REMARKS
This section discusses the following two additional issues: immunity of the S-boxes against linear cryptanalysis and a relation between the SAC and the profile of a di~erence distribution table.
IMMUNITY TO LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS
Linear crltpt.analysis is yet another powerful cryptanalytic attack discovered very recently by Matsui [12] . This cryptanalytic method exploits the low nonlinearity of S-boxes employed by a block cipher, and it has been successfully applied in attacking FEAL and DES.
Given an n x s S-box (fl,... ,Ym), where each f, is a function on V,, a linear cryptanalyst calculates the number of times that
iml 3ml assumes the value zero, for all nonzero vectors (al .... , a,) E V, and nonzero vectors (ba,...,b,) E I/o. The cryptanalyst then examines how far the numbers deviate from 2 "-1.
Those which deviate the farthest are particularly useful for linear cryptanalysis.
In the original exposition of linear cryptanalysis [12] , only counting the number of times that f assumes the value zero was described. This approach, however, captures only half 180 of the information that is useful for linear cryptanalysis. The other half is obtained by counting the number of times that f assumes the value one. The two halves complement each other in the sense that one can be derived from the other. We can treat these two halves in a unified way by calculating the number of times that With S-boxes constructed in [13, 1, 19] , any nonzero linear combination of the component functions is a bent function. Hence these S-boxes have the strongest pmsible immunity to linear cryptanalysis. Unfortunately, as was discussed before, their component functions are not balanced, and even worse, their difference distribution tables are fiat and hence they are not immune to differential cryptanalysis.
As is indicated by Theorem 6, for the S-boxes constructed in this extended abstract all nonzero linear combinations of the component functions are highly nonlinear. Hence we conclude that they are immune against linear cryptanalysis.
SAC VS DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION TABLE
We have shown that the component functions of a robust S-box ~ = (¢i ..... ~,+t) constructed by (13) in Section 6 all satisfy the SAC. In fact we have shown a much stronger result, namely, all but 2 t -1 of their nonzero linear combinations satisfy the SAC. This should be compared to H = (f2,..., wk) constructed by (6) . H is not robust against differential cryptanalysis. However, all nonzero linear combinations of its component functions satisfy the SAC. This raises a question as to whether all nonzero linear combinations of the component functions of a very robust S-box, whose difference distribution table contains zero entries in all its rows, can satisfy the SAC.
We prove that the answer to the question is negative. In other words, for any S-box whose difference distribution table contains zero entries in all its rows, at least one nonzero linear combinations of its component functions does not satisfy the SAC. 
AN EXAMPLE
The procedure for generating an n x • S-box, where n _> ~ >
[n/21 + t, can be described in the following step~. 2. Obtain from D a matrix E of linear functions on V~ by substituting ~i with z~+2, where 0 _< i --< k -1. Note that E is a 2 ~ x 2 t matrix, and that the first row and the first column of E contain only zeros.
3. Obtain a 2 ~ × 2 "-~ matrix H by selecting 2 n-~ distinct nonzero columns from E. When the maximum algebraic degree n -k + 1 is required, E should be chosen so that the condition (3) is satisfied.
4. Permute the columns of H.
5. Construct k+t functions fl, ..., fs+, by (9) . Note that g~+l .... , g~+t can be any distinct functions chosen from gl, ..-, g2~-1.
6. Select a (k + t) × (k + t) nondegenerate matrix A so that its ith row 7i, i = 1,...,k + t, can be written The final S-Box is q~ = (¢1 .... , ¢10), where ¢(z) = y~(zA).
Let ¢ ---(~)~e 1 [c~@j] be a nonzero linear combination of ¢1,...,@10. By Theorem 4, @ has the properties described here. 4 . In the first column, the first entry contains a value 2 z~ ----4096, (2 z2-z° -1)27 ----384 other entries contain a value 2 ~2-v = 32, and the rem~ning 3711 entries contain a value zero.
Consequently, the robustness of the S-box against differentim cryptemalysis is (~ + 2-S)(l --2 -5) ~ 0.878.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a method for systematically generating cryptographically strong S-boxes. The method is based on a~ interesting combinatorial structure cMled group Hadaanard matrices. We have shown that the method is much superior to previous approaches, and that it generates promising S-boxes in terms of their robustness aga£nst differential crypt~na]ysis, immunity to linear cryptmaalysis, SAC fulfilling properties, high nonlineaxities and algebraic degrees. We have also illustrated the construction method by an example of 12 x 10 S-boxes. Future research directions include the investigation of possible further improvements on the algebraic degrees, the nonlinearities and the profiles of the difference distribution tables of the S-boxes.
